Expand to see abstracts for my work-in-progress articles.
A longstanding view holds that solidarity has distinct symmetric and asymmetric kinds. It claims that solidarity is symmetric when agents reciprocally recognize each other as part of the same social group, and asymmetric when agents act for others. At stake are an agent’s motivations: agents in symmetric solidarity are considered civic-minded (i.e., we-thinking), while agents in asymmetric solidarity are considered altruistic. Using two examples—the solidarity of a labor union strike and the solidarity of student anti-genocide encampments—I argue that solidarity’s paradigmatic civic-minded motivations (i.e., we-thinking) do not rest on agents’ reciprocally recognized group membership.
Instead, solidarity’s civic-minded motivations arise in negation; the we is defined by its resistance. Although campus protests look like students acting for faraway others, students in solidarity do not act altruistically; their solidarity is marked by their resistance to the institutional structures that implicate them in the harms abroad. Similarly, workers collectively strike to resist enacting their bosses’ harmful demands. All solidarity rests on asymmetric social relations, yet all agents act on solidarity’s unique civic-minded motivations.
I distinguish solidarity from the popular resistance framework of allyship and argue that solidarity is the superior practice for resisting systemic oppression. In allyship, privileged allies relate to and act on behalf of the objective, justice-based interests of structurally disempowered oppressed groups. As is often repeated: a good ally listens and learns from the testimony of oppressed agents. However, by promoting deference to oppressed agents’ testimony, allyship overlooks intersectional differences and treats oppressed agents as authoritative representatives of their group. As a social practice, allyship thus not only fails to empower oppressed agents’ resistance but also reifies oppressed groups.
Alternatively, solidarity’s cross-privilege (i.e., asymmetric) relationships involve intimate cooperation in which agents civic-mindedly act on each other’s prudential interests. In solidarity, privileged and oppressed agents relate through united resistance rather than as members of different social groups, and treat each other as fellows (i.e., one of "us") rather than others. Whereas allyship creates a fixed division of resistant labor in which privileged agents act on oppressed agents’ testimony, solidarity instructs all agents to testify to their experiences and take resistant action. Through shared practices of deliberation and reflection, agents minimize the paralyzing effects of oppressive double binds and empower each other to resist oppressive structures.
In this chapter, I argue that solidarity’s nature is political intimacy. Solidarity forms in negation; agents jointly disaffiliate from structures that implicate them in harm. Through shared practices of deliberation and reflection, agents reveal (to themselves and others) what is most important to them, while simultaneously letting their fellows direct and interpret the importance. In this way, solidarity’s relationships are intimate, like friendships and loving relationships. However, solidarity’s intimate relationships differ from friendships and loving relationships because they are cause-mediated and therefore impersonal. Thus, solidarity’s intimate relationships transform individuals’ personal identities and create new, inclusive social groups. I motivate this account by arguing that it better captures solidarity’s values than alternative accounts based on pro-group attitudes and affects; solidarity as political intimacy empowers agents and collectives by uniting across differences, prioritizing heterogeneity, and thus serving as an inclusive ideal.
Solidarity is widely recognized as a form of social cohesion that produces robust we-identities, yet existing theories struggle to explain how its we-identities form. This paper argues that neither dominant model of identification—the depersonalization process of self-categorization theory nor the personalization process in close personal relationships—adequately explains solidarity. Depersonalization falls short because solidarity is resistant; individuals cannot self-categorize into a group that does not yet exist. Personalization falls short because solidarity relations are cause-mediated and impersonal; individuals in solidarity need not know one another personally. I propose aspirational identification as an alternative: individuals recognize themselves as different from others in the solidarity group and take resistant action against an authority that produces those differences, so they can share more with each other. This account captures solidarity’s impersonal, hypothetical, and reflective character while explaining why solidaristic action often precedes solidaristic identification. By requiring neither shared traits nor personal knowledge, aspirational identification explains solidarity’s robust role in self-conception without diminishing its moral worth as an inclusive ideal.
In this paper, I argue that solidarity is necessary for moral agency under oppression because solidarity’s intimate relationships provide the social structures for relational agency that institutional structures erode. Oppressive double binds structure oppressed agents’ choices, forcing them to cooperate with their own oppression. Resistance is punished, while compliance is rewarded. However, in solidarity, oppressed and privileged agents alike challenge each other’s adherence to oppression’s script and materially support each other’s resistance. For oppressed agents, this minimizes the weight of oppressive double binds. For privileged agents, this allows them to see how their agency is structured by the same oppressive system and break free from enforcing oppression’s scripts.